Volume 22
Issue 4 Symposium on Anticipating Transboundary Resource Needs and Issues in the U.S. Mexico Border Region to the Year 2000
Fall 1982

Principes for Transboundary Groundwater Pollution Control
Ludwik A. Teclaff

Recommended Citation
Ludwik A. Teclaff, Principes for Transboundary Groundwater Pollution Control, 22 Nat. Resources J. 1065
(1982).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol22/iss4/26

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

Ludwik A. Teclaff*

Principles for Transboundary
Groundwater Pollution Control
International groundwater law has been a stepchild of international
water law, which is still predominantly concerned with surface waters.
The significant new doctrines which, starting from the premise of the
areal unity of the river basin or river system assume the right of basin
states to an equitable share in the basin's waters, pertain to groundwater
only insofar as it is connected with surface water.' Here groundwater
shares in the progress of the law vicariously, through the back door. But,
of course, not all groundwater is connected with surface streams or lakes.
The so-called fossil waters have been likened to minerals, and it has been
suggested that rules analogous to mining law may apply to them.2 This
underscores the fact that the aquifer with the land overlying it, rather
than the river basin, is the basic unit of groundwater regulation, and that
principles unifying the management of surface and underground waters
have not yet been satisfactorily enunciated. In municipal law, the evolving
conjunctive use of surface and underground waters may produce rules
adaptable to international situations. 3 It is likely, however, that in international practice the areal unit of this coordinated management will be
neither the river basin nor the aquifer, but an artificial unit comprising
both or parts of both, whose boundaries will be determined by the range
of mutually felt effects of water use. The extent of groundwater pollution
would then become an important, if not the most important, factor in
establishing the areal limits of this international unified management of
transfrontier water resources.
Just as the evolution of rules for apportioning transfrontier groundwaters lags behind that for transfrontier surface waters, so the effective
regulation of transboundary groundwater pollution lags behind (and even
further behind) the evolution of rules for transfrontier surface water pol*Fordham University School of Law
1. International Law Ass'n., Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers,
Report of the 52nd Conference held in Helsinki on Aug. 20, 1966, 7-8 (1967). Art. II defines an
international drainage basin as determined by "the watershed limits of the system of waters, including
surface and underground waters, flowing into a common terminus."
2. See Utton, InternationalGroundwater Management: The Case of the U.S.-Mexican Frontier,
in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW 157, 181-84 (Teclaff & Utton, eds. 1981).
3. Teclaff, An International Comparison of Trends in Water Resources Management, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 881, 906-13 (1979).
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lution. It is true that the surface water rules are still chiefly conventional,
but some of these conventions in Europe and in North America are important and elaborate instruments that deal exclusively with transfrontier4
pollution, including provisions for standard-setting and for enforcement.
By contrast, there are very few treaties concerned with government pollution and then only indirectly, as part of the regime of frontier surface
waters.' They are areally narrow and lack any standards. There are cogent
reasons for this slow progress; they rise from the special character of
groundwater pollution.
The Special Character of GroundwaterPollution6
Some day it will be possible by remote sensing equipment to "lift the
lid" off an aquifer and find out exactly what is happening beneath. At
present, although new and frightening examples of groundwater pollution
turn up every day, the extent, the sources, and the pathways of contamination are not well known and are poorly understood. Groundwater -is
polluted when pollutants are discharged into an aquifer's intake or recharge area (land surface), into wells tapping the aquifer, or into surface
streams that feed it, while polluted groundwater in its turn may contaminate surface water. The sources of pollution are frequently more numerous and more widely distributed than in the case of surface water
contamination and, while many of them arise from water-related activities, others have nothing whatever to do with water use per se. There is
a close connection between groundwater quantity and quality, and one
of the aspects unique to groundwater pollution is that a transboundary
injury may be at least partially self-induced, for, if a state depletes its
own part of an aquifer faster than the natural recharge, pollutants may
infiltrate from a part of the aquifer across the border.
There are other important differences between ground and surface water
pollution. Groundwaters store contamination, and the process is often
irreversible. Cleanup and retrieval are difficult, costly and often impractical. Measures of control and enforcement appropriate for surface waters
4. See e.g., Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, Nov. 22, 1978, United States-Can., 30
U.S.T. 1383, T.I.A.S. No. 9257, text also in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW, supra
note 2, at 362; Switzerland-France, Convention on Protection of Lake Leman Waters Against
Pollution (1962), text in Organization For Economic Co-operation and Development, Environmental
Protection in Frontier Regions 418 (1978), and in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW,
supra note 2, at 458.
5. Teclaff and Teclaff, Transboundary Ground Water Pollution: Survey and Trends in Treaty
Law, INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW, supra note 2, at 77-115.
6. See Hayton, The Ground Water Legal Regime as Instrument of Policy Objectives and Management Requirements, INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW, supra note 2, at 57-75; Tripp
and Jaffe, Preventing Groundwater Pollution: Towards a Coordinated Strategy to Protect Critical
Recharge Zones, 3 HARV. ENVT'L. L. REV. 1(1979), at 3-9; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, OFFICE OF DRINKING WATER, PROPOSED GROUND WATER PROTECTION
STRATEGY (Nov. 1980), at 111-2- 111-6, and OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, WATER PLANNING
DIVISION, GROUNDWATER PROTECTION (Nov. 1980).

October 1982]

TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATER POLLUTION CONTROL

1067

may be irrelevant because the course of the pollutants cannot be traced
or the polluters positively identified. Monitoring is far more difficult and
expensive than in the case of surface water, because wells have to be
an aquifer, many
dug, and if these wells are scattered haphazardly over
7
missed.
be
will
contamination
of
plumes
localized
Data Collection and Exchange, Notification and Consultation
In view of these difficulties, the first need in transboundary pollution
control is to develop rules for the collection and dissemination of information. So far, few countries have any data base from which the magnitude of groundwater contamination can be determined. This poses a
dilemma: untold damage may be done on the one hand, by delaying
regulation until enough substantive information is gathered and, on the
other, by establishing standards and controls on the basis of too little
information. There is no question, however, that data gathering must be
undertaken on a continuing basis and of a most detailed kind. This is
spelled out, for example, in the Recommendations of the U.N. Water
Conference at Mar del Plata in 1977, which called specifically for the
establishment of data-gathering networks for groundwater quality, the
systematic indexing of such data to determine gaps in knowledge, and
the determination of "the variables of aquifers." 8 The U.N. Interregional
Meeting of International River Organizations at Dakar in May, 1981 urged
those co-operating states that have not yet included groundwater as part
of the shared water resources system to entrust their international river
and lake organizations with the collection of hydrogeologic data. 9
There is no longer any doubt that modem treaty practice incorporates
the duty to exchange information and to notify other states of potentially
harmful effects,"° and the international regulation of pollution appears to
7. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "generally, basin-wide monitoring
detects a problem only when contamination has reached a stage where water quality changes are
regional in nature." PROPOSED GROUND WATER PROTECTION STRATEGY, supra note 6, at
111-8.
8. Report of the United Nations Conference, Mar del Plata, Doc. No. E 77, II Annexes, at 7,
Recommendation A.3 (c) (Mar. 14-25, 1977).
9. U.N., Interregional Meeting of Int'l River Organizations, Dakar, Senegal, 5-14 May, 1981,
para. 47 (vi), Final Report of the Meeting (June 1981). The International Boundary and Water
Commission (IBWC) is already carrying out such data exchange and an aerial surveillance program.
See Utton, supra note 2, at 170. The difficulties and expense of the task of collecting hydrogeologic
data are illustrated by the fact that the Commission of the European Communities completed in 1979
a voluminous study of the underground water resources in the Community, with 10 country reports
and 152 maps, but has no funds to print and disseminate the results. See O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
C 60) 6 (1981).
10. See Teclaff, Harmonizing Water Resource Development and Use with Environmental Protection in Municipal and International Law, 16 NAT. RES. J. 807,846-50 (1976); Bourne, Procedure
in the Development of the International Drainage Basins: The Duty to Consult and to Negotiate, 10
CAN Y.B. INT'L. L. 212-34 (1972).
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be progressing toward the concept that states sharing a resource bring
their information-gathering methods to a comparable degree of expertise. " This raises the question whether data must be provided as a matter
of course on existing situations or only when a country is undertaking
some measure or activity. In a 1980 report by the OECD Environmental
Committee on application of information and consultation practices for
preventing transfrontier pollution,' 2 alternative procedures were put forward: one concerning the dissemination of data on activities or measures,
the other taking the form of routine communication, notably within international commissions or organizations, of data concerning pertinent
aspects of the environmental policy of the country providing the information.
The duty to exchange information should not become a coverup for
doing nothing except order more studies. This has been a Canadian criticism of the U.S. attitude to the acid rain problem. 3 The OECD Recommendation of 1974 on Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution
would obligate countries to provide early information, enter into consultation at the request of the affected or potentially affected countries,
and diligently pursue it."
11. See e.g., Art 10 of the EEC directive on protection of groundwater against pollution spells
out the type of data to be supplied. European Economic Community, Council Directive On the
Protection of Groundwater Against Pollution Caused by Dangerous Substances. 23 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 20) 43 (1980); text also in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW, supra note
2, at 330. The establishment of nuclear reactors in border regions of western Europe has recently
brought forth a number of agreements and recommendations that could apply to the prevention and
control of groundwater contaminants. The bilateral agreements all contain provisions for exchange
of information and consultation, and the EEC has intervened by proposing the introduction of a
Community consultation and arbitration procedure on plans to site nuclear power stations in frontier
areas. These treaties are noted in 22 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 34-35 (1978); 25 Id. 38-41 (1980).
On the Community consultation and arbitration proposal, see O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 147)10
(1981).
12. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Report by the Environmental
Committee, Application of Information and Consultation Practices for Preventing Transfrontier
Pollution, text in OECD, Transfrontier Pollution and the Role of States 8, 10 (1981) §§ 5 and 6 (b).
This report also proclaims that information and consultation should respect the sovereignty and
legitimate interests of the participating countries, and not make a decision by one country. to undertake
a potentially polluting activity entirely dependent on the prior consent of the exposed country. Id.
at p. II, sec. 9 (a).
13. See 4 Int'l. Env't. Rep. (BNA) Current Rep. 1008-09 (Sept. 9, 1981).
14. Text in 14 INT'L LEG. MAT. 242 (Nov. 21, 1974). This procedure has been followed in the
case of a Canadian power plant on the Poplar River which may adversely affect groundwater on the
U.S. side. In 1977 the International Joint Commission established the International Poplar River
Water Quality Board. In 1979 the Board urged the two countries to monitor the plant's boron
emissions for impact on surface and groundwater, and in September 1980 this resulted in a U.S.Canadian agreement setting up a bilateral monitoring committee. See Caponera and Alheritiere,
Principles for International Groundwater Law, in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW,
supra note 2, 25 at 49; 2 Int'l Env't. Rep. (BNA) Current Rep. 859 (Sept. 12, 1979) and 3 Id. at
466 (Sept. 8, 1980).
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Classificationand Standards
Once an adequate data base has been established for a transboundary
groundwater resource, the next task is classification. Should the resource
be preserved from pollution altogether (a "non-degradation" policy)?
Should it be, if at all possible, restored to its original or near-original
state? Should it be classified according to the level of contamination
present and the use to which it is currently put, and earmarked for a
similar use in future? Circumstances suggest that all three approaches
may be validly employed. There is widespread support for the idea that,
because groundwater is such a valuable source of water supply for drinking and because its pollution can rarely be reversed, all aquifers with
water of potable quality, whether currently used or unused, should be
preserved in their present state. The U.S. Safe Drinking Water Act of
1974, for example, provides for the designation of an entire aquifer as a
sole source if it is the only or principal drinking water source for an area;
to date only a few sole-source designations have been made, but one of
them is for an interstate aquifer. 5 Non-degradation, however, may be
inapplicable where an aquifer or part of it has been irretrievably contaminated. Pollution often moves slowly and in narrow plumes, such that
parts of an aquifer may be badly affected and others not. This suggests
that different levels of quality may be established for different parts of
an aquifer and various uses segregated according to their potentiality for
contamination.
The classification of aquifers provides a basis for the establishment of
standards and the adoption of management practices, recharge zone protection, land use regulation and other measures for groundwater protection. The obligation to develop norms for water quality seems already
established in international law. Two recent examples of its expression
are contained in Articles IV and V of the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement 6 and in the 1979 Athens Resolution of the Institut de Droit
International,' 7 which states in Article VII. 1(f):
States bordering the same hydrographic basin shall ... establish by
common agreement environmental norms, in particular quality norms
for the whole or part of the basin.
They are only beginning to be developed for groundwater, however. In
this direction, the EEC has gone furthest in progressing toward a com15. Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§300f-300j (1976). Section 300h-3 is the
"sole source" provision.
16. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 4.
17. Athens Resolution of the Institut de Droit International, The Pollution of Rivers and Lakes
and International Law, 58 Annuaire de I'Institut, Part I, 196-203 (1979).
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prehensive set of rules. Its 1979 directive on protection of groundwater
against pollution caused by certain dangerous substances' 8 groups pollutants according to their toxicity into a "black" list for those considered
most dangerous, whose direct discharge or injection underground would
be prohibited altogether, and a "grey" list of less toxic substances whose
discharge, whether directly or indirectly, would be governed by authorization. Member states may make exceptions under a system of prior
authorization for discharges into aquifers which are isolated from the
biosphere and unusable for any other purpose. This comprehensive EEC
directive, therefore, provides for both receiving water standards and effluent standards. The attainment of standards, however, is far more difficult for groundwater than for surface water, in particular because of the
difficulty of monitoring and tracking pollutants to their source.
Other measures which help to achieve or preserve the desired quality
of water may include, depending on circumstances: well spacing; regulation of pumping rate; isolation and sealing off of contaminated wells;
monitoring and regulation of irrigation practices; establishment of minimum flows in surface streams interconnected with transboundary aquifers, and control of surface diversions; establishment of salt-water barriers
in coastal areas where sea water intrusion is a problem; and artificial
recharge of aquifers with water of a specified standard of purity.' 9
Land Use Regulation
For the fullest protection of a groundwater resource some land use
regulation is essential, especially in the critical recharge area of an aquifer.
Such measures may have to include regulation of activities right down
to the level of the individual householder and pose delicate problems of
encroachment upon national sovereignty, local government, and private
property.
Generally, the activities covered should include broad-scale operations
such as pesticide and fertilizer application; major new housing developments; mining; oil and gas recovery; disposal of hazardous wastes;
municipal landfills; and any activity that strips a critical recharge area of
its vegetative cover. While such regulatioh is an essential element in the
protection of aquifers for drinking water supply and other high-quality
18. Council Directive on the Protection of Groundwater Against Pollution Caused by Dangerous
Substances, supra note 11.
19. Some of the measures are already contained in bilateral treaties. For example, the minimumflow requirement for surface streams (which helps maintain groundwater levels in valley and lake
basin alluvium and hinders the infiltration of pollutants into underlying aquifers) goes back more
than a century in some European agreements, although it was not established with groundwater in
mind. See Teclaff & Teclaff, supra note 5, at 86-87.
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uses, 20 prohibiting certain land uses cannot be a blanket requirement. It
must be consonant with the use to which the groundwater is or will be
put and, therefore, tailored to the individual aquifer or segment of aquifer,
for it would be futile, for example, to prohibit animal feedlot operations
in an area irreversibly contaminated by salt water intrusion.
Concepts of zoning for groundwater use and protection are by no means
new in domestic law, 2' and are finding their way into international and
interprovincial agreements. The idea of limited use zones assigned to
specific activities and specific means of waste disposal so as to contain
the most polluting activities within the smallest possible compass and to
isolate them from areas of natural resource value is to be found, for
example, in the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (although
the boundary of such a zone may not transect the international boundary). 22 It is also implicit in the EEC's 1979 directive on the protection
of groundwater against pollution caused by certain dangerous substances,23 which has the effect of prohibiting certain activities altogether
and permitting others only where an aquifer or part of an aquifer has
been rendered permanently unsuitable for use for domestic or agricultural
purposes.
Hazardous waste disposal is actually and potentially perhaps the most
serious source of pollution of groundwater and should receive top priority
as a subject of international concern. The EEC has addressed the problem
in its 1979 groundwater directive 24 and also in its directive of 20 March,
20. The EEC lumps together domestic and agricultural purposes to that end. See Council Directive
on the Protection of Groundwater Against Pollution Caused By Dangerous Substances, supra note
i1, Preamble and Art. 4 (2).
21. The harim or prohibited area around a well is a centuries-old device in Moslem water
management. See D. Caponera, Water Laws in Moslem Countries (FAO Agricultural Development
Paper No. 43) (1973). More recently, several countries have established critical zones of groundwater
depletion. See Teclaff, An InternationalComparison of Trends in Water Resources Management, 7
ECOLOGY L.Q. 881, 892 (1979). The concept of a "designated international groundwater area"
as a basis for apportionment of groundwater to prevent excessive depletion has been developed by
Utton, in International Groundwater Management: The Case of the U.S.-Mexican Frontier, supra
note 2, at 176-77. Minute No. 242 of the International Boundary and Water Commission establishes
a protective and regulatory groundwater pumping program for a zone extending 5 miles on either
side of the international border. Text in 69 Dept. State Bull. 395 (1973) and in INTERNATIONAL
GROUNDWATER LAW, supra note 2, at 360. The areal limits of a zone for groundwater pollution
protection may have to be much wider, extending over the recharge area or even the entire aquifer.
Entire aquifers have been designated as "sole sources" under the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974,
42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1976).
22. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 4, Art. IV(1)(f) and Annex 2.
23. Council Directive on the Protection of Groundwater Against Pollution Caused by Dangerous
Substances, supra note 11.
24. Id., especially the provisions on indirect discharge and disposal or tipping of substances which
might lead to indirect discharge, Arts. 4 (1), 5, and 10.
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1978 on toxic and dangerous waste, 25 which requires detailed recordkeeping and the storage, treatment and deposit of such wastes only under
permit. Some countries, because of their special hydrogeological situation
(e.g., the Netherlands), have no storage facilities for toxic wastes and
must send them to other countries for storage.26 In at least one case, this
has resulted in a water pollution problem for a third country. 27 Conversely,
a state may be required by the terms of a surface-water treaty to dispose
of its hazardous wastes at risk to its own citizens. The reason why the
Rhine Chlorides Convention of 1976 is virtually a dead letter is that
France refused to bury the wastes of its Alsace potash mines by means
of a deep-well injection system on its own territory.28
Remedial Measures
As numerous horrifying cases of hazardous waste pollution have shown,
groundwater contamination may have existed for a long time undetected
and may not be traced to any identifable source. In this type of situation
it is not possible to apply the polluter-pays principle after the damage
has been done and force an individual polluter to accept liability. Other
means must be found to provide for clean-up of the contamination. In
the United States the Superfund Act of 198029 creates a $1.6 billion fund,
subsidized 87.5 per cent by taxes on the petroleum and certain chemical
industries and 12.5 per cent by the U.S. Treasury, to cover the costs of
cleanup and remedial action resulting from the release of hazardous substances into the environment. It has already been used for cleanup of old
waste sites causing groundwater contamination and awards have been
made to states under federal-state cooperative agreements. A somewhat
similar concept was already in existence in the lease agreements negotiated with private contractors in the United States for the storage and
disposal of radioactive wastes, whereby the lessee undertakes to pay
25. EEC Council Directiveon Toxic and DangerousWaste (20 March 1978 (text in 21 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 84) 43 (1978) and in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW, supra note 2,
at 311.
26. See Written Question No. 1785/80 to the Commission of the European Commmunities and
answer in 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 88) 8-9 (1981).
27. The German Democratic Republic has offered the Benelux countries a waste disposal facility
whose site assessment is disputed, located in the immediate vicinity of the water supply of Lubeck,
in the German Federal Republic. See Written Question No. 1687/79 to the Commission of the
European Communities and answer in 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 126) 82 (1980).
28. Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution by Chlorides, Dec. 3, 1976,
text in 16 INT'L LEG. MAT. 265 (1977) and in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW, supra
note 2, at 273. On the current situation, see 5 INT'L ENV'T. REP. (BNA), CURRENT REP. 31617 (Aug. i1, 1982).
29. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
96-510, 94 Stat. 2767. On the use of Superfund for cleanup of groundwater contamination, see 12
ENVT'L. REP. (BNA) REP. 548, 559 and 616 (1981).
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regular and specified amounts into an escrow fund for perpetual care of
the waste. 30 The European Economic Commission, in its Council Directive of 1978 on toxic and dangerous waste, 3" also requires that the cost
of disposing of such waste be borne by the holder and/or previous holders
or producers of the waste, and provides further that the yield of levies
charged may be used to finance control measures and research. So far,
however, the concept does not seem to have been applied in relation to
transboundary groundwater pollution, but a similar idea has been incorporated in the 1977 Franco-Swiss agreement concerning recharge of the
Genevese aquifer,32 which establishes a financing procedure to ensure by
means of advance payments proportional to the amount of water pumped,
an aquifer level adequate for normal operation of installations throughout
the year.
The superfund and similar concepts make no provision for compensation for pollution damage, and the individual victim or potential victim
of transboundary pollution until recently had little hope of access to
administrative and judicial proceedings in another country. This situation
is slowly changing. It is very important for the individual groundwater
user to have such access, because groundwater contamination often is
highly localized and affects only small numbers of people, even though
the injury may be devastating, as in the case of toxic pollutants. The
OECD has elaborated the principle of equal right of access in its Guidelines on Cooperation in Frontier Regions, 33 and the 1979 Athens Resolution of the Institut de Droit International urges states, both for the sake
of prevention and compensation, to conclude conventions concerning the
jurisdiction of courts, the applicable law and the enforcement of judgments; to develop safeguards for individuals by granting non-discriminatory access to judicial and administrative procedures; and to set up
compensation funds for damage the origin of which cannot be clearly
determined." 4
30. Nuclear Waste Management, Hearings By the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation of the
Committee on Environment and Public Works, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) 748-55.
31. Council Directive on Toxic and Dangerous Waste, supra note 25.
32. Arrangement Relating to the Protection, Utilization and Recharging of the Franco-Swiss
Genevese Aquifer, September 6, 1977, Council of State of the Republic and Canton of Geneva and
the Prefet of Haute-Savoie (Unpublished); the French text is reproduced in INTERNATIONAL
GROUNDWATER LAW, supra note 2, at 464, English summary at 461-63. This is a noteworthy
example of an agreement between political subdivisions of states. It establishes liability on the part
of the Canton of Geneva for any deterioration in the water quality of the aquifer due to defective
maintenance or error in its operation of the recharge station.
33. OECD Recommendation for Strengthening International Co-Operation on Environmental Protection in Frontier Regions, adopted Sept. 31, 1978, final text in 17 INT'L. LEG. MAT. 1530 (Nov.
1978) at 1531.
34. Athens Resolution, supra note 17, Arts. VI and VII.I.i. These principles are finding their
way into practice. In 1980 a Dutch trade association, seeking redress for Rhine River pollution,
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Instruments for Implementation
Although awareness of the danger of groundwater pollution is increasing, the binding effect of remedial rules may be indefinitely delayed if
left to the slow processes of creating customary international law. Even
in the management of surface transboundary waters, with a longer history
of development, few customary rules have gained general acceptance and
even those lack precision.
To be effective, rules for the management of transboundary groundwater resources, including those concerning pollution, should be embodied in a convention or in parallel legislation of the countries involved.
An agreement establishing parallel legislation might be preferable to the
parties because it would leave them more discretion to reach agreed goals;
nevertheless it would have to define these goals and establish some timetable. It may leave the establishment of machinery for the implementation
of these goals to each party, except that there would be a need for a joint
commission to supervise and report progress in the control of pollution,
and might also be empowered to suggest means of harmonizing pertinent
laws of the parties.
The European Economic Community has come a long way down this
road of harmonization in its directives on drinking water, disposal of
waste oils, titanium dioxide waste, toxic and dangerous waste, and
groundwater protection, and it is now considering directives specifically
on transboundary pollution." All of these directives contain elements
which can fruitfully be taken into consideration in devising a transboundary groundwater protection policy. In view of the slow progress toward
a comprehensive treaty between Mexico and the United States, it may
be more practicable to try and resort to parallel legislation.36 The IBWC
could be utilized as the supervising agency, but its areal jurisdiction would
have to be greatly expanded and it would have to be given explicit power
filed suit in the administrative court of Strasbourg, France, to prevent the prefet of the Bas-Rhin
department from issuing the annual discharge permit to the Alsace potash mines. 3 INT'L. ENV'T.
REP. (BNA) CURRENT REP. 534 (Dec. 10, 1980).
35. EEC Proposal for Council Directive relating to quality of water for human consumption (31
July 1975); 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 214) 2 (1975); Council Directive on disposal of waste
oils (16 June 1975), Id. (No. L 194) 23 (1975); Council Directive on waste from the titanium dioxide
industry (20 Feb. 1978), Id. (No. L 54) 19 (1978); Council Directive on toxic and dangerous waste
(20 Mar. 1978), Id. (No. L 84) 43 (1978); Council Directive on the protection of groundwater against
pollution caused by dangerous substances (17 Dec. 1979), Id. (No. L 20) 43 (1980). The texts of
the foregoing directives are also reproduced in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW, supra
note 2, at 284-330. The proposals for directives on transfrontier environmental impacts of certain
industrial activities and certain public and private projects are contained in 22 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 212) 4 (1979) and 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 169) 14 (1980).
36. This was suggested by R. D. Hayton in his Recommendation No. 10 On Institutional Arrangements. Hayton, InstitutionalAlternatives for Mexico-U.S. GroundwaterManagement, in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW, supra note 2, 135 at 144.
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to survey, investigate, and monitor, as well as to suggest new laws and
regulations. 3
A comprehensive treaty, though more difficult to achieve, may be more
effective. Groundwater pollution protection as an area of treaty-making
is a tabula rasa, and the initial step should be to conclude an agreement
to reach agreement (such as the U.S.-Canada Memo of Intent on Transboundary Air Pollution),38 setting forth the data and reports required as
a basis for drafting the main instrument. Many questions must be resolved.
Should the treaty be a simple framework one, delegating details to its
operating entity, or should it be a more detailed instrument? Are existing
entities for surface water management competent under their enabling
treaties to undertake the difficult and delicate task of groundwater pollution control? What should be the areal limits of an entity's jurisdictionthe river basin? the aquifer? the frontier zone, however defined?
What functions should be allocated to the entity? What role should
local and regional authorities in border areas play? What mechanisms
should be established for settlement of disputes and can this task be left
to municipal courts, or should it be the purview of a special court? These
are all questions which require much study in relation to the specific
circumstances of a border region, for very few principles have universal
application in this field.
Institutionsfor GroundwaterProtection
The meager international practice shows that groundwater pollution
prevention, if dealt with at all, is generally entrusted to all-purpose "watereconomy," "frontier river," or "mixed" commissions.39 The existing
international river basin commissions do not offer much hope of effective
control of this unique problem; they are primarily consultative bodies
with weak future planning machinery and no power to make binding
decisions. Even entities specifically set up for surface-water pollution
control have not been very effective. It took the International Commission
for the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution the better part of two
decades to come up with a possible solution to the problem of chloride
pollution, yet the resulting Convention is now moribund and the parties
have resorted instead to inter-ministerial discussion.4" The recommendations contained in the 1974 Draft European Convention for the Pro37. The present jurisdiction of the IBWC is given in Art. 24 of the 1944 Treaty. Treaty Relating
to the Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, United
States-Mexico, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994. Text also in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER
LAW, supra note 2, at 338.
38. Memorandum of Intent on Transboundary Air Pollution, Aug. 1980, United States-Can., 3
INT'L ENV'T. REP (BNA) CURRENT REP. 391-92 (Aug. 13, 1980).
39. See Teclaff and Teclaff, supra note 5, at 90-95.
40. Id. at 89-90; and 4 INT'L ENV'T. REP., CURRENT REP. 629 (Feb. il, 1981).
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tection of International Watercourses Against Pollution confine the functions
of an international commission to data collection, recommendations to
the contracting parties on early warning systems, programs and objectives
for reducing pollution, and studies on joint financing of large-scale projects for pollution control. 4 A more promising approach is to be found in
some interprovincial agreements, such as the interstate compacts establishing the Delaware and Susquehanna River Basin Commissions.4 2 Both
of these institutions have quite broad powers; they can, inter alia, act
outside the basin, operate projects, set standards, classify the basin waters,
and issue orders enforceable in court, all of which powers pertain to
ground as well as surface waters.
Even so, groundwater control is exercised within areal units of surface
water management. This approach is entirely valid in the case of an aquifer
or aquifers, such as the Rhine Valley water-table, underlying a major
river which forms the frontier for much of its length. It is less appropriate
to situations in which a long land frontier is transected by a few widely
separated rivers and several large and important aquifers. On the other
hand, the establishment of entities aquifer by aquifer may lead to an
unfortunate division and duplication of responsibilities. To be effective,
the commission implementing a groundwater protection treaty, whether
a surface-water entity or one set up specifically for the purpose, should
first of all have areal jurisdiction extensive enough to include all the
aquifers transecting the frontier, or at the very least their recharge areas.
The commission should have authority to survey the area under its jurisdiction and to promulgate standards of water purity as well as regulations for land use, especially for the protection of recharge areas. It
ought not to be beyond the constitutional powers of the federal governments of Mexico and the United States to make a commission responsible
by treaty for regulating land use over and around a transboundary aquifer.
In the United States, in any case, federal government power to regulate
pollution extends to groundwater without the need to invoke treaty power,
and may be broad enough to include land use regulation directly connected
with water management.
The commission should also have authority to monitor and enforce its
rules. It may in addition act as a tribunal for the resolution of disputes
and complaints of private parties. Alternatively, a special tribunal could
be created to deal with complaints regardless of which side of the border
41. Draft European Convention for the Protection of International Watercourses Against Pollution
(1974), text in 1974 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N., v. II, Part Two, at 346.
42. Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961); Susquehanna River
Basin Compact, Pub. L. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 (1967). The texts of both compacts are in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW, supra note 2, at 398 and 419.
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they come from. Special water tribunals are well known in municipal
law, for example in Spain and Italy, and they also function well in Israel.43
Regional and local entities can play a useful role as adjuncts to a
commission of wider areal jurisdiction. Given well-defined and sufficient
powers, such entities could go far toward the harmonization of land use
regulation on both sides of a frontier and the resolution of transboundary
groundwater contamination problems, which are apt to be highly localized." The 1978 OECD Guidelines for Strengthening International Cooperation on Environmental Protection in Frontier Regions 45 recommend:
1) that countries encourage their regional and local entities to cooperate with their counterparts across the frontier in resolving
environmental problems;
2) that they devise whatever bilateral or mulilateral frameworks may
be needed for carrying out joint action;
3) that they ensure that such transfrontier cooperation work as effectively as cooperation between provinces of the same country;
and

4) that countries expressly empower officials in regional or local
administration to establish all necessary contacts with their counterparts on the other side of the frontier.

The 1979 Athens Resolution of the Institut de Droit International addresses
the same problem, but less forcefully. It merely urges states, in setting
up international commissions, to provide for the participation of local
authorities "if this proves useful."" The practice of local authorities has
already outdistanced such a timid proposal. Recently a French prefect
ordered a new factory in a border area to apply German air quality7
standards and give German authorities access to application documents .4
Transboundary cooperation could hardly go further.
43. See Teclaff, Abstraction and Use of Water: A Comparison of Legal Regimes (U.N. Doc. ST/
ECA/154 (1972), 200-03. For an alternative procedure for resolving problems, see Art. 20 of the
Franco-Swiss agreement on the Genevese aquifer, supra note 32. Disputes are to be brought first
before the Franco-Genevese Regional Committee and then, if not resolved, before the French-Swiss
Consultation Commission for Neighborly Relations.
44. A regional alliance of this nature, between New England governors and Canadian province
premiers, has been proposed to combat acid rain pollution. See 4 INT'L. ENV'T. REP (BNA),
CURRENT REP. 972 (Aug. 12, 1981).
45. OECD Recommendation, supra note 33, Part III. See also the discussion and examples of
involvement of political subdivisions of states in the treaty-making process in Alheritiere, International Cooperation and Inland Waters: The Influence of Federalism, A. UTTON & L. TECLAFF,
WATER IN A DEVELOPING WORLD: THE MANAGEMENT OF A CRITICAL RESOURCE at
166 (1978).
46. Athens Resolution, supra note 17, Art. VIII. I.g.
47. 3 INT'L. ENV'T REP. (BNA), CURRENT REP. 405-04 (1980).
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PRINCIPIOS PARA EL CONTROL TRANSFRONTERIZO DE CONTAMINACION
DE AGUAS SUBTERRANEAS
La primera necesidad en el control transfronterizo de la contaminaci6n es el desarrollo
de reglas para la captaci6n y diseminaci6n de la informaci6n. En seguida, la clasificaci6n de los acufferos puede dar una base para establecer medidas para la proteccci6n
de aguas subterrineas, incluyendo la reglamentaci6n del uso de ]a tierra. El establecimiento de medidas protectoras y de saneamiento requerirfa legislaci6n paralela,
tratados. Finalmente, las entidades que deben vigilar el progreso internacional del
control de la contaminaci6n deben tener suficientes facultades para promulgar y hacer
cumplir las normas.
El Caracter Especial de la Contaminaci6n Subterrdnea
Los senderos de la contaminaci6n no son del todo conocidos. Los contaminantes pueden afectar
el agua subterrAnea decargindola en la toma o en un ,.rea de recarga de un acuffero, en sus manantiales
o en las corrientes superficiales que lo alimentan. Muchas fuentes de contaminaci6n ni siquiera se
originan en actividades relacionadas con el agua. En acufferos transfronterizos los contaminantes
pueden infiltrarse desde el otro lado de la frontera cuando un Estado reduce su parte de un acuifero
mts all de la recarga natural.
A diferencia del agua superficial, las aguas subterrfneas almacenan la contaminaci6n. Su limpieza
y recolecci6n es diffcil y costosa. Tambi6n algunas zonas localizadas de contaminaci6n hacen que
los contaminantes sean diffciles de rastrear.
El primer requerimiento en el control transfronterizo de la contaminaci6n es el desarrollo de reglas
para la collecci6n y diseminaci6n de la informaci6n. Tanto la conferencia de las Naciones Unidas
sobre Agua en Mar del Plata, en 1977, como la Reuni6n Interregional de las Naciones Unidas de
Organizaciones Intemacionales Riberefias en Dacca, en 1981, hicieron un llamado en favor de Ia
colecci6n de datos hidrogeol6gicos. Tambi6n la prictica modema de los tratados incorpora el deber
de intercambiar informaci6n y de notificar o otros Estados sobre efectos potencialmente dafiinos.
La clasificaci6n de acufferos requiere determinar si un recurso debe ser preservado de la contaminaci6n, reabastecido a su nivel original o reservado para un uso apropriado a su nivel de contaminaci6n. Una opini6n generalizada mantiene que todos los acufferos con agua de calidad potable
deben de ser preservados. La clasificaci6n de acufferos provee una base para establecer normas,
prActicas de manejo, reglamentaciones para el uso de la tierra, y otras medidas para la protecci6n
del agua subterrnea. La Comunidad Econ6mica Europea ha desarrollado normas para la calidad
del agua subterrnea, agrupando los contaminantes de acuerdo con su toxicidad. Otras medidas que
pueden ayudar a preservar la calidad deseada del agua incluyen el espaciamiento de pozos, la
reglamentaci6n de la tasa de bombeo y el sellado de los pozos contaminados.
Reglamentaci6n del Uso de la Tierra
La reglamentaci6n en el uso de la tierra ayuda a proteger un recurso de aguas subterrdneas. Las
medidas pueden incluir la reglamentaci6n de aplicaci6n de pesticidas y fertilizantes, desarrollo de
viviendas, minerfa, petr6leo y recuperaci6n de gas, la destrucci6n de desperdicios peligrosos, los
rellenos con desperdicios o cualquier actividad que le suprima a una drea crftica de recarga su cubiera
vegetal. El arrojar desperdicios peligrosos el la fuente mAs seria de contaminaci6n de aguas subterrdneas. Para responder a esto la EEC Ileva registros detallados del tratamiento de desperdicios y
requiere permisos para tirarlos.
Medidas de Saneamiento
El concepto de "fondos excedentes" provee un medio para financiar la limpieza de aguas subterrineas, pero todavfa no ha sido aplicado a la contaminaci6n transfronteriza de ellas. La dificultad
en atribuir el origen de la contaminaci6n a una fuente identificada hace muchas veces que no sea
posible forzar a un contaminador individual a aceptar su responsabilidad. La Ley de Fondos Excedentes de los EUA de 1980 cre6 un fondo de 1600 millones de d6lares, subsidiado principalmente
por las industrias petroleras y qufmicas, para pagar el costo de la limpieza de substancias peligrosas
en el medio ambiente. Algunos contratistas privados, en sus convenios de arriendo, contribuyen
tambidn a fondos reservados para el cuidado perpetuo de desperdicios radioactivos. En Europa, la
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EEC requiere que elque tiene y elque produce el desperdicio carguen con el costo de deshacerse
en 61.
Para compensar por los dafios de lacontaminaci6n lavfctima individual de lacontaminaci6n
transfronteriza debiera tener acceso a los procedimientos administrativos y judiciales de otros parses.
Recientemente laOECD elabor6 el principio de derecho igual de acceso. Tambidn laresoluci6n del
Institute de Droit International de 1979, de Atenas, urgi6 a los Estados a celebrar convenciones
acerca de lajurisdicci6n de los tribunales y laaplicaci6n de laley para fines de prevenci6n y
compensaci6n.
Instrumentos Para laPuesta en Practica
Los parses que comparten recursos podrian usar legislaci6n paralela para elcontrol de lacontaminaci6n. Las partes deberfan definir metas y establecer calendarios. Una comisi6n conjunta podrfa
supervisar y reportar elprogreso individual de cada pais. Si M6xico y los EUA adoptaran legislaci6n
paralela laComisi6n Intemacional de Lfmites y Aguas seria utilizada como organismo supervisor.
Un tratado comprensivo aunque mds diffcil de lograr puede ser efectivo. La protecci6n contra la
contaminaci6n de aguas subterrdneas, como objeto de un tratado, es tabula rasa, de tal manera que
el primer paso debiera ser elconcluir un acuerdo para celebrar un tratado. El tratado mismo puede
ser un instrumento detallado que establezca los requisitos especificos o un simple marco, que delega
los detalles a algtin organismo que lo aplique.
Una comisi6n efectiva para aplicar un tratado de protecci6n de aguas subterrfineas debe tener
jurisdicci6n en el drea de todos los acufferos de lafrontera. Debiera tener autoridad para inspeccionar
el frea de su jurisdicci6n y promulgar normas de calidad de agua, asfcomo reglamentar el uso de
latierra. La comisi6n tambidn debiera tener autoridad para verificar elcumplimiento y hacer valer
sus propias reglas. Una entidad con tales poderes, bien definidos y suficientes, podria ir lejos en la
resoluci6n de problemas transfronterizos de lacontaminaci6n del agua subteffinea.

